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Abstract
Software vendors are increasingly adopting Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)
pricing model, whereby software is offered as a web-based service in exchange for a
subscription fee. In addition, software vendors become increasingly interested in using
bundling of services to maximize their market penetration, revenue and, or profits. The
objective of this paper is aimed at presenting and demonstrating a method that can be
used to estimate consumer-level reservation prices for a set of SaaS offerings, to show
how the method can be used to categorize different services based on the heterogeneity
of reservation prices, and thirdly, to determine the optimality of different bundling
strategies. A conjoint analysis study is used to determine the reservation prices of the
services and to assess what price-bundle combinations are most attractive. Next a
simulation model is used to show that the optimality of different bundling strategies.
The results underline the importance of a value-based perspective on SaaS pricing
models in pursuing different objectives of software vendors. To achieve profit
maximization, software vendors should consider mixed price-bundling strategies in
which bundles are offered at a discount. In case SaaS offerings complement a core
service as well as entail high contribution margins (i.e. the services are reinforcing) a
pure price-bundling strategy may be considered to target highly profitable customers.
To achieve revenue maximization, mixed price-bundling should be considered for SaaS
offerings with competing characteristics. In case the SaaS offerings are reinforcing, an
unbundled strategy should be considered.
Keywords: Bundling, pricing, conjoint analysis, reservation prices, software-as-aservice
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1. Introduction
The software industry continues to go through a major transformation in the way
software is delivered. Computing today involves the use of many software packages,
but only a few packages are used on a daily basis. This infrequent usage pattern often
does not justify purchasing full licenses and therefore motivates a need for a more
flexible way to use and pay for the usage of software [1]. Therefore, software vendors
are increasingly adopting the Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) model. In the SaaS model,
vendors host applications at a central location, for instance enterprise resource planning
(ERP) and customer relationship management (CRM) systems. SaaS presents the
embodiment of a one-sided market model for developing and delivering IT services,
wherein services flow in a linear fashion from vendors to customers, with revenues
flowing in the opposite direction. SaaS offers customers greater flexibility to switch
vendors. Switching vendors is difficult with packaged software, which generally has a
modular structure, allowing customers to extend their systems over time by adding new
modules. With packaged software, customers experience high costs when switching,
resulting in lock-in and give a software vendor a monopoly position over existing
customers [2].
However, SaaS providers have to deal with reduced gross margins as a result of the high
fixed operation costs involved in the hosting infrastructure [3]. This makes achieving
economies of scale increasingly important [4]. Reduced switching costs pose new
challenges to software vendors in terms of customer retention and profit generation.
Carefully crafted service pricing and bundling strategies offer several opportunities.
First, bundling has the potential to increase and stabilize customer retention levels.
Customers who subscribe to a bundle of services are less likely to leave for a better deal
that affects only one of the service components in the bundle. Furthermore, it is
recognized that promotional bundle discounts are strongly related to the customer‟s
perceived value for a given bundle and consequently the customer’s willingness to
switch to the provider. Also, a firm can apply bundling to its product line to increase
market penetration. Offering a bundle at a special price encourages customers to
subscribe to the entire bundle who would otherwise only subscribe to some of the
components. And finally, bundling allows firms to apply price discrimination to
enhance revenues and profits. Hence, SaaS providers can apply bundling and pricing
strategies to attain and retain market penetration, revenue and profit levels.
It has been recognized that, in order to apply these strategies successfully, one of the
key activities to be carried out is an economic value analysis. “Economic value analysis
is a tool designed to comprehend and to quantify the sources of value of a given product
for a group of potential customers” [5]. Customer value can be seen as the maximum
price people are willing to pay for a product or service. Economists call this the
reservation price. “The reservation price is the highest price that a given person will
accept and still purchase the good. In other words, a person‟s reservation price is the
price at which he or she is just indifferent between purchasing or not purchasing the
good” [9]. Insight into the reservation price and its heterogeneity supports SaaS
providers in determining pricing and bundling strategies aimed at either maximizing
market penetration, revenue or profits. Several researchers have attempted to estimate
consumer-level reservation prices. Some focus on single-service or single-product
bundling [10-11] or on the bundling of a relatively low number of products or services
(3 or fewer) [12], which makes the direct application of these methods to larger and
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more heterogeneous product-lines, like SaaS bundles more difficult. The goal of this
paper is threefold. Firstly, it is aimed at presenting and demonstrating a method that can
be used to estimate consumer-level reservation prices for a set of SaaS offerings.
Secondly, its aim is to show how the method can be used to categorize different services
based on the heterogeneity of reservation prices, which is important for determining
optimal bundling strategies. And thirdly, it is aimed at determining the optimality of
different bundling strategies for pursuing market penetration, revenue and profitability
objectives.
All this is realized by determining the most suitable research approach and method
given the goals of this paper. The research method is then applied to categorize and
estimate reservation prices from a set of ten services from a large software vendor.
Using a simulation model, several hypotheses are tested and the optimal bundling
strategies for different types of services and objectives are determined.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, a review on bundling, pricing and
reservation price literature is carried out, on the basis of which hypotheses are
formulated. In section 3, the research approach, experimental design and simulation
model are discussed. In section 4, the analysis is carried out and the results discussed. In
section 5 and 6, the managerial implications, conclusions, limitations and future
research areas are provided.

2. Literature review and hypotheses formulation
A definition of bundling. Adams & Yellen [13] define bundling as “selling goods in
packages”. Guiltinan [5] stresses that bundles are marketed at a special (discount) price,
while Stremersch & Tellis [6] note that bundles consists of separate items for which
different markets exist. In this paper the following definition of bundling is adopted:
“bundling is the marketing and selling of separate services as a single package for a
single price”, which underlines the fact that bundling is more than merely “selling a
package”. For reasons of decreased price sensitivity, increasing purchase likelihood,
perceived savings, perceived sacrifices and one-bill convenience, it has been recognized
that the way the bundles are marketed has a significant influence on their perceived
customer value [6]. The services included in a SaaS provider‟s product line can contain
diverse services, which address different customer segments with different levels of
willingness to pay. In this paper, the focus is on the use of bundling to increase a SaaS
provider‟s revenue through price discrimination [7], making it possible to address
consumers who are willing to buy the bundle at a discount, but who would otherwise
only buy one of the items.
Bundling strategies. There are several types of bundling strategies, which can be
differentiated on the basis of two characteristics: (1) the bundle focus and (2) the bundle
form. With regard to the former, a bundling strategy can focus on [6]: (1) pricebundling, (2) product bundling or (3) both. In the case of price-bundling, two or more
non-integrated and in our research non-related services are sold as a package at a
„discount‟ price. The total value of the package delivered to the customer equals the
sum of the components‟ customer value. With product bundling, two or more services
are sold as a package for a „single‟ price. The integration between the components
enhances the individual value of each component, which means that the total customer
value of the package is more than the sum of the components‟ customer value. The
additional value being created can be translated into revenues by offering the bundle. In
this paper, the focus is on the price-bundling of non-integrated and non-related services
3
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only. The second characteristic involves the bundle form [14]: (1) unbundling, (2)
mixed-bundling and (3) pure bundling. In the case of unbundling, services can only be
subscribed to separately. With mixed bundling, services can be subscribed to both
separately or as a bundle. With pure bundling, the services can only be subscribed to as
a bundle. The challenge for firms is to determine which bundle focus and bundle form
to pursue.
Next to bundle form, bundle composition plays a role. Bundle composition can be about
mutually reinforcing services (e.g. communication and presence information for mobile
communication), complementary (e.g. mobile phone and subscription), unrelated (e.g.
ringtones and weather information on a mobile) or competing (e.g. ring tones service A
and B). The focus in this paper is choosing the optimal bundling strategy for different
types of non-integrated and non-related services. While normally in service bundling the
services are interdependent in terms of demand, we are focussing on services that are all
related to administration practices, but can be considered to be unrelated (see table 2).
We expect to acquire insight which services, that from a supply side are perceived to be
unrelated, might appear to be complementary or supplementary when we analyses the
demand side.
Pricing schemes and methods. Software vendors can apply different pricing schemes
for charging customers for the use of their SaaS offerings. The pricing schemes for SaaS
offerings extend the known schemes for packaged software. Common pricing schemes
for SaaS include a per time-period fee, an on-demand fee based on per-use such as with
packaged software, per-transaction or per-feature, and free access (the so called
freemium model). A per-time period fee is sometimes dubbed as renting [15]. The
customer has to renew his contract if he wants to continue using the service after the
expiry date. In all cases, it is useful to have insight into how much value a customer
attaches to a charging unit. However, here the focus is on presenting a method for SaaS
offerings with a per time-period fee.
Kotler [38] outlines several pricing methods for setting the pricing level of these
charging units. In this paper, the focus is on perceived-value or value-based pricing. We
make this choice because quantifying and communicating customer value plays a large
role in the success of introducing new SaaS offerings. The idea is to price services (just)
below the consumer‟s reservation price. The reservation price is determined by the
surplus value of the service and the perceived fairness of transaction. “The surplus value
of products and services is the difference between the economic value assigned to them
and their price. The perceived fairness of the transaction is influenced by the price paid
compared with internal reference prices” [8]. The internal reference price is the price
level that is considered fair. The challenge in the case of value-based pricing is to apply
a method that can accurately determine the perceptions of the customer [16].
Optimality of bundling strategies. An important factor in determining which strategy is
optimal involves the heterogeneity in conditional reservation prices [6]. There are two
types of heterogeneity: (1) asymmetry and (2) variation. Consider two services: A and
B. An asymmetric distribution occurs when, for service A, one customer segment has a
lower conditional reservation price than another, while for service B the former
customer segment has a higher conditional reservation price than the latter. This
asymmetric distribution in conditional reservation prices leads to a negative correlation
between the service preferences [13] In the case of the second type of heterogeneity,
variation, there are large differences in reservation prices for the bundle. A high
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variation occurs when the perceived customer value is high within one customer
segment and low within another segment.
The optimality of a pricing and price-bundling strategy depends on the deviation from
„first-order price discrimination‟, whereby each consumer is charged an individual price
such that a SaaS provider does not diminishes its profits [17]. According to Adams &
Yellen [13], there are three conditions under which a pricing scheme is optimal:




Exclusion: consumers are excluded from subscribing to a service if the reservation price is below the costs
of providing the service;
Inclusion: a consumer for which the reservation price exceeds the costs of providing the service actually
subscribes to the service;
Extraction: from all consumers who subscribe to the service do not realize any consumer surplus (i.e. the
price paid is equal to the willingness to pay).

Because SaaS providers are often restricted from applying personalized pricing (i.e.
service prices are pre-defined), the heterogeneity of conditional reservation prices
affects the deviation from these three conditions.
Hypotheses. Guiltinan [5] argues that services can be either reinforcing or competing.
Services are reinforcing if the subscription of a customer to one service increases the
likelihood of that customer also subscribing to another service. In other words, the
conditional reservation prices are positively correlated. Services are competing if that
likelihood is reduced. In other words, the conditional reservation prices are negatively
correlated. Bundling is especially beneficial in cases where conditional reservation
prices are negatively correlated, as this would lead to a reduction in the price variation
for the bundle [6]. We hypothesize that:
H1: When a firm’s goal is to maximize revenue, mixed price-bundling is the best
strategy if the services are (partially) competing in terms of demand.
For the same reason, it is hypothesized that:
H2: When a firm’s goal is to maximize revenue, unbundling has the least adverse
impact on revenue if services are mutually reinforcing in terms of demand.
Schmalensee [40] states that the higher the normalized difference between the average
reservation price for the service and costs of subscribing to the service is, the more
likely the price-bundling of services are to enhance profits. On the other hand,
Stremersch & Tellis [6] note that the price-bundling of high contribution margin
services (i.e. the difference between the price and the variable costs of provisioning) are
better able to raise profits. The higher the contribution margin the lower the extra
induced sales quantity should be to make a bundle discount profitable. Bouwman,
Haaker, & De Vos [19] argue that services may either be complementing/enhancing or
supplementing. Enhancing services directly increase the benefits of the core
service/experience, while supplementing services extend benefits in new directions . We
hypothesize that:
H3: When a firm’s goal is to maximize profits, pure price-bundling has the least
adverse impact on profits if services are complementing the core service/activity and
services are mutually reinforcing in terms of demand.
For the same reason, it is hypothesized that:
H4: When a firm’s goal is to maximize profits, pure price-bundling has the most
adverse impact on profit if services are supplementing the core service/activity and
services are (partially) competing in terms of demand.
Because pure price-bundling is a special type of mixed price-bundling for which the
separate services‟ prices are extremely high and unbundling is a special type mixed
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bundling for which the price of the bundle is extremely high [6] the following is
hypothesized:
H5: When a firm’s goal is to maximize profits, mixed price-bundling is either the best
strategy or no worse than any other strategy regardless of the types of services.
The goal of market penetration is not to exclude customers from subscribing to any
service. Stremersch & Tellis [6] argue that revenues from a bundle are always higher (if
conditional reservation prices are asymmetric) or equal (if conditional reservation prices
are symmetric) to the revenues from the separate services. We hypothesized that:
H6: When a firm’s goal is to maximize market penetration first and profits second,
pure price-bundling is either the best strategy or no worse than any other strategy.
These hypotheses indicate under what conditions and for what objectives specific
bundling strategies may be optimal. Several methods need to be applied to test
hypotheses applicability to SaaS offerings.

3. Method
In this section the methods are discussed for measuring customer value, quantifying
customer value in monetary value and evaluating different bundling and pricing
strategies for different performance objectives. The research design process follows the
standard procedure for conjoint surveys [20]. For the first step, a part-worth function
model was used. The regression coefficients represent the utilities of each service. For
the second step, the full profile method was used. For the third step, a fractional
factorial design was used. Using an orthogonal array, a subset of combinations of
attribute levels was created. We selected 10 add-on services in such a way that there
shouldn‟t be reinforcing mechanism or interaction (see table 1). In determining the price
attribute level, conditional pricing was used, while the design remains orthogonal and
unencumbered by prohibitions. The assumed prices for the services were specified by
carrying out a competitor study. The prices can be low (25% discount), regular or high
(25% surcharge) (see table 1). The bundle price is calculated on the basis of the services
included in the bundle and the discount level as indicated by the price attribute. This
resulted in 16 profiles/bundles with different combinations of services at different
pricing levels. Two additional profiles were included to test the predictive validity of the
conjoint measurement data.
Table 1: The ten included services in the conjoint Experiment
Service

Description

1. Book keeping

Vouchers are processed for by an administrator

22.50

Low / Regular / High price
30.00

37.50

2. Accounting

Administration is verified and taxes are declared.

22.50

30.00

37.50

3. Invoicing

Digital and postal invoicing on receipts.

7.50

10.00

12.50

4. Time registration

Registration of billable hours.

3.75

5.00.

6.25

5. Expense registration

Registration of made expenses for a customer.

3.75

5.00

6.25

6. Mileage registration

Keep track of your mileage expenses.

3.75

5.00

6.25

7. Project collaboration

Plan and manage a project involving multiple members.

11.25

15.00

18.75

8. Project acquisition

Matching of possible project requests with your profile.

7.50

10.00

12.50

9. Debt collection

Initiate a debt collection procedure for defecting customers.

7.50

10.00

12.50

10. Pay rolling

Remunerating yourself on a monthly basis

7.50

10.00

12.50

The fourth step was carried by collecting response via an online web survey in 2010.
The questionnaire was distributed via freelancer portal sites and a general mailing list.
People were selected on the basis of sector characteristics and the number of employees.
A total of 70 respondents participated in the study, 23 respondents were eliminated
6
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which did not show any intent to subscribe to the presented service bundles. The
vignettes that were presented showed the bundle composition and the bundle price. For
the fifth step, a 7-point rating scale was used to measure the purchase intention. Next,
part-worth utilities for individual respondents were calculated using ordinary least
squares (OLS). Constrained nonlinear regression (CNLR) was used to constrain the
price coefficients to be negative or positive for treating possible price reversals and to
investigate whether the predictive validity of the model could be improved
Reservation price estimation method. Generally speaking, to estimate the consumer-level
reservation prices from the conjoint analysis, the utility of the no-choice option needs to
be estimated. This no-choice utility level determines the minimally required utility from
a service(bundle) will it be preferred over the no-choice. A choice from an individual
for the no-choice option implicates that none of the alternative services in the set gives
the individual sufficient utility to consider subscribing to at least one of the services.
Following this line of reasoning, the utility of the no-choice is determined by the utility
of the individual‟s status quo and the utility of each of the alternatives in the
consideration set (i.e. the utility of the no-choice option is not necessarily zero).
Following Kohli & Mahajan [10], it is assumed that an individual i prefers service s
over his or her consideration set if:
(1)
,







where U is|~p is the utility of service s for individual i excluding the utility of price from service s (or in
case conditional pricing is applied: the utility of service s for individual i including the utility of the
regular price level),
Ui(p) is the utility contribution of the absolute monetary price level p to individual i‟s utility for a service,
Ui* is the highest utility of any option (including the no-choice option) in his or her consideration set and
ɛ is a small value (here it is assumed that ɛ equals 0) selected by the user in any application of the model.
si is the estimate of the individual‟s reservation price ri for service s if equation 1 is satisfied as an equality,
that is, it is the price at which the utility of item s exceeds by ϵ the utility of the most preferred item in
consumer i‟s evoked set. As Ui (p) is assumed to be a single-valued, decreasing function of price, a single
reservation price p is is estimated for each customer.

According to Kohli & Mahajan [10] equation (1) holds in case the utility of the chosen
base case option equals the utility of the no-choice option. In our case (and other
applications of traditional conjoint analysis) the utility of the base case option is
inversely related to the utility of the no-choice, and hence is not equal to the no-choice
option. Therefore, in order to simulate consumer choice and to determine reservation
price pi for which equation (1) is satisfied as an equality, it is necessary to prevent the
incorporation of the no-choice option‟s utility in equation (1). Jedidi & Zhang [11] show
that traditional conjoint analysis can be augmented for this purpose. Their approach
shows that it is legitimate to use the utility of a chosen base case option as the utility of
the no-choice option, in which case the following formula can be applied in calculating
the reservation price for service bundle ri (Sb) and simulating consumer choice:
(2)





where
is the reservation price for the service bundle,
is the change in price from the regular price level, where = p-25%, 0, or p +25%
is the change in utility from that price change, actually the ß‟s from the dummy‟s in a linear
conjoint analysis, and
is the change in utility for including service s in the bundle.



Σ s=1, N refers to of summation of the utilities of the services in the bundle

The first fraction can be seen as the exchange rate between units of utility and
difference in price. The changes in utility invoked by including a service in the bundle,
as compared to the base case, may be multiplied by an exchange rate to calculate the
7
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reservation price for the service (bundle). To make interpretation easier, an empty
bundle may be chosen as the base case. If dummy coding is applied to code bundleprice combinations, the constant from the part-worth utility function equals the utility of
the base case. Jedidi & Zhang‟s theoretical derivations validate the common practice of
converting attribute utility changes to monetary values.
The part-worth utilities of the services can be translated into reservation prices by
applying formula 2. In case conditional pricing is used, as we do here, equals the
reservation price deviation from the regular price level. In its application, the service
coefficients vary among the customers, while the discount and surcharge price
coefficients are fixed. According to formula 2, the reservation price for a service is
equal to the ratio of the service coefficient with respect to either the discount or
surcharge price coefficient (depending on whether a service is considered too expensive
or too cheap). By fixing the price coefficients, the distribution of the reservation price
has the same form as the distribution of the service‟s coefficient. Here it is assumed that
the service coefficients are all normally distributed and the reservation prices for the
services are also normally distributed. This makes it possible to compare the different
strategies for the different services. It also prevents incorrectly signed price coefficients
from creating implausible reservation prices and near zero price coefficients from
creating extreme high or low reservation prices. As far as the service coefficients are
concerned, we see no reason for restriction, because customers could value a service at a
regular price as either positive or negative.
Simulation model specification. The hypotheses can be tested via two types of models: (1)
analytical models and (2) simulation models. In the first approach an analytical model
of consumer behaviour is used to deduce the optimality of different bundling strategies
for different service characteristics (e.g. reinforcing, competing, enhancing and
supplementing characteristics). An alternative approach concerns the use of a simulation
model. Instead of analytically computing the outcomes of a specific bundling and
pricing strategy, simulation is used to test the optimality of bundling and pricing
strategies. To this end, a spreadsheet-model was specified, for which the following steps
were carried out:









For the services under consideration, an array of reservation prices is specified by the user on the
basis of the conjoint analysis;
For the services under consideration, the user specifies the cost levels of providing one unit of
the service;
For the three different bundling strategies, the reservation prices of the three offerings are
calculated by the program. It is assumed that a bundle‟s reservation price is equal to the sum of
the component‟s reservation prices;
For the three different offerings, an array of prices is specified which the program tries to
optimize;
Based on the reservation prices and the prices of the offerings, the program calculates the
consumer surplus;
Based on the consumer surplus, the actual sales levels are calculated according the following
rules: a consumer buys an offering if and only if the consumer surplus is positive and the
consumer surplus is the highest among the offerings. In case the consumer surplus of the bundle
equals the consumer surplus of one of the components, the consumer buys the bundle. If the
consumer surplus of an offering equals zero, the consumer buys the offering;
Based on the calculated sales levels, the specified cost levels and the calculated optimal prices,
the program calculates the revenue and profit per offering.

To determine the optimal prices, the optimization tool Evolver from Palisade was used.

8
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4. Results
The aggregate conjoint model. Multiple linear regression analysis was used to
estimate the aggregate main-effects model. The results of this analysis are shown in
table 3. Because conditional pricing is applied the presented utilities cannot be
interpreted independently from the pricing attribute. Consequently, the utility
coefficients indicate whether on average the reservation price is below (negative sign)
or above (positive sign) the regular price of the service. For example, it can be
calculated that, on average, the reservation price of the accounting service is 13 percent
above the regular price of the service. Also, on average, the respondents perceive that
their reservation price is 3 percent below the regular price of the book-keeping service.
Services with a positive utility (2, 3, 4, 5 and 10) may be regarded as enhancing the
administrative core activity/service, and services with a negative utility (1, 6, 7, 8 and 9)
may be regarded as unrelated supplementing services, that open new avenues for
business development for SaaS providers. Needless to say, this classification would
only hold for the target segment respondents represent.
Table 2: Average importance, calculated part-worth utilities and positiveness of services
Part-worth utility
Services

Importance

Coefficient

Standard

Percentage

Deviation

positive

P

1. Bookkeeping

9.848

-.029

.699

51.1%

ns

2. Accounting

9.959

.215

.648

59.6%

.047

3. Invoicing

7.689

.040

.606

61.7%

ns

4. Time registration

6.171

.029

.406

55.3%

ns

5. Expense registration

8.143

.088

.575

59.6%

ns

6. Mileage registration

8.058

-.098

.580

46.8%

ns

7. Project collaboration

9.228

-.173

.628

36.2%

ns

8. Project acquisition

7.001

-.114

.493

44.7%

ns

9. Debt collection

7.821

-.178

.539

44.7%

ns

10. Pay rolling

9.455

.125

.737

61.7%

ns

2.420

1.321

Low price (25% discount)

.293

.403

80.9%

Regular price

.059

.350

55.3%

High price (25% surcharge)

-.351

.344

10.6%

Constant
Pricing

16.629

Model fit: Average Pearson's R = .989 (P < .000). Average Kendall's Tau = .919 (P < .000). Average Kendall's Tau for Holdouts = 1.000.
Aggregated Pearson's R = .219 (P < .000). Aggregated Kendall's Tau = .155 (P < .000). Aggregated Kendall's Tau for Holdouts = .289

The individual conjoint models. The estimation of individual level coefficients enables
the analysis of variation (e.g. through standard deviation measures) and asymmetry (e.g.
through correlation measures) of conditional reservation prices. The overall outcomes of
this analysis have been appended to table 3. The Pearson‟s R of 0.989 (P < 0.000),
Kendall‟s Tau of 0.919 (P < 0.000) and Kendall‟s Tau for Holdouts of 1.000
respectively indicate a good fit, consistency in rating the profiles and predictive validity
of the individual-level models. A high variation in preferences exists for all services.
The preferences for the pay-rolling service show the largest variation (SD = 0.737),
which is a logical observation, because this service is, a priori, only relevant for 47
percent of the respondents. The preferences for the time registration service, which is
relevant to 72 percent of the respondents, are the most homogeneous (SD = 0.406).
Services with a high variation may be good candidates for bundling because delivering
these services as an unbundled offering either excludes many consumers from
9
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subscribing or gives consumers a high consumer surplus in their subscription to the
service.Table 2 also shows the relative importance of the bundle attributes for the
overall perceived value. It can be concluded that price is an important attribute in
people‟s intention to subscribe. Although making a careful bundle composition is
critically important, as the price attribute is relatively important, pricing discounts can
significantly increase people‟s intention to subscribe to certain service bundles.
The positiveness indicates the share of the respondents that positively assess the value
of a service relative to its costs at an advertised price equal to the regular price. The
unrelated services (2, 3, 4, 5 and 10) have the highest levels of positiveness and can be
considered to be complementing. While services (1, 6, 7, 8 and 9) have the lowest levels
of positiveness and therefore are more supplementary in nature.
Table 3 shows the asymmetry of conditional services preferences. From the total of 45
estimated coefficients, only the 7 statistically significant coefficients are shown.
Table 3: Asymmetry of conditional service preferences
Services

Pearson's
Correlation

P

1. Bookkeeping

2. Accounting

.327

.025

1. Bookkeeping

4. Time registration

.351

.015

3. Invoicing

4. Time registration

-.371

.010

3. Invoicing

5. Expense registration

.363

.012

6. Mileage registration

8. Project acquisition

.374

.010

7. Project collaboration

10. Pay rolling

-.427

.003

8. Project acquisition

9. Debt collection

,291

,047

To summarize, both from an extraction and an exclusion point of view, the pricebundling of the invoicing and the time registration services would be most profitable
because of its complementing characteristics to the core service/activity and its effects
on lowering the variation in conditional preferences for the bundle. However, it would
appear that the price-bundling of other negatively correlated services can also be
optimal in case a higher discount applies to the bundle.
Simulation of bundling strategies. With the use of the reservation price estimation
method, a simulation was carried out for different bundling strategies for four
combinations of services. To calculate the maximum profit of each strategy, it was
assumed that the variable cost of each unit of service was 75 percent of the regular
price. The results of the simulation are shown in table 5. From a revenue maximization
perspective, a mixed bundling strategy is always the best if the bundled services are
(partially) competing (A3 & B3). This means that hypothesis 1 can be accepted. It can
also be seen that an unbundling strategy is not worse than any other strategy in cases
where the service are mutually reinforcing (C3 & D3). In fact, the optimized mixed
bundling strategy for reinforcing services turns out to be an unbundling strategy with an
extremely high price for the bundle, which confirms hypothesis 2.
From a profit maximization perspective, it can be seen that the pure price-bundling of
complementing and reinforcing services do not adversely affect profit levels compared
to a mixed bundling strategy (C2). The complementing characteristics create a high
normalized difference between costs and price. Because of the reinforcing
characteristics of the bundled services, demand for the bundle is not reduced much
compared to the separate offerings. Hypothesis 3 can therefore be accepted.
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Table 4: Optimality of different bundling strategies for different types of services under different
objective
Revenue maximization
Services

Profit maximization

Market penetration maximization

Total

Total

Contribution

Total

Total

Contributi

Total

revenue

profit

margin

revenue

profit

on margin

revenu

Total profit

Penetration

e
A. Bundling competing and complementing services
1.

3

4

429

88

21%

351

111

32%

75

-431

97%

2. Bundled

3

4

418

-10

-2%

390

98

25%

32

-496

100%

3. Mixed

3

4

445

89

20%

441

119

27%

32

-496

100%

Unbundled

B. Bundling competing and supplementing services
1.

7

10

586

65

11%

464

157

34%

131

-691

94%

2. Bundled

7

10

617

73

12%

503

110

22%

127

-735

98%

3. Mixed

7

10

710

137

19%

509

172

34%

127

-735

98%

Unbundled

C. Bundling reinforcing and complementing services
1.

3

5

435

90

21%

367

117

32%

102

-393

94%

2. Bundled

3

5

415

100

24%

328

115

35%

160

-335

94%

3. Mixed

3

5

435

90

21%

340

118

35%

216

-271

94%

Unbundled

D. Bundling reinforcing and supplementing services
1.

6

8

370

10

3%

269

85

32%

71

-420

93%

2. Bundled

6

8

325

44

14%

231

74

32%

19

-487

96%

3. Mixed

6

8

372

12

3%

277

90

32%

24

-486

97%

Unbundled

On the same note, supplementing services imply a low normalized difference between
costs and price (B2). The competing characteristics adversely affect the profit, which
means that hypothesis 4 can be accepted, and because, when it comes to maximizing
profits, a mixed bundling strategy is the best or at least equal to any other strategy (A3,
B3, C3 & D3), hypothesis 5 can therefore be accepted.
From a market penetration perspective, it can be seen that a pure price-bundling
strategy is not always the best strategy to maximize market penetration (C2 & D2). For
some services, a mixed bundling strategy achieves a higher market penetration, because
some consumers show negative reservation prices which offset the positive reservation
price of the other service (D3). In this case, an additional unbundled offering would
maximize penetration, although under the condition that the use of the positively valued
service is only possible if the negatively valued service is also used. In other words, the
use of the former service is conditional upon the usage of the latter. Whether this is
actually the case depends on the design of the services. Therefore hypothesis 6 can only
be fully accepted in case the usage of either service is unconditional.

5. CONCLUSIONS
Six hypotheses were tested using the simulation model, in which the results of a
conjoint analysis were used in the reservation price estimation method. All hypothese
were accepted with the notion that hypotheses 6 was accepted under the condition that
the use of either of the bundled services does not depend on the use of any of the other
services. Otherwise, a mixed bundling strategy may be best.
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Our results illustrate how a set of methods, conjoint analysis, reservation price
estimation methods and simulation, can be applied to optimally bundle and price a set of
SaaS offerings. The methods that have been used in this study have some limitations.
The focus of the research was on main effects for these unrelated services and not in
interaction effects. Secondly, in transforming conjoint utilities into reservation prices,
the price coefficient was fixed. Thirdly, the service and price coefficients involve
random errors and may involve cases of price insensitivity.
Future research is needed to test and improve the predictive validity of the reservation
price estimation method. For practical research a promising area of study is the adoption
of conjoint analysis or other suitable methods for optimally designing of transactionbundle based SaaS offerings.
.
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